Court of Appeals Rules that Order of Civil Contempt Cannot Be Based Solely on Failure to Pay Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs

ByDouglas C. Melcher

On April 11, 2024, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided Kayode v. Midas Construction, LLC, 21-CV-0561, Slip op. (D.C. Apr. 11, 2024) in which it considered whether a party may be held in civil contempt for failing to pay an award of attorney’s fees and costs.

By way of background, the plaintiff brought claims against the defendants (a construction company and its owner) for breach of contract, negligence, and consumer protection violations. See Slip op. at 1. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on a forum selection clause in the parties’ construction contract. See id. at 1-2. It also awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the defendants pursuant to a fee-shifting provision in the construction contract. See id. at 2. When the plaintiff failed to pay the award, the trial court held the plaintiff in civil contempt. See id. The plaintiff appealed the order of civil contempt. See id.

The Court of Appeals began its review of the merits by stating the applicable legal standards. It stated that a trial court has express authority, pursuant to D.C. Code § 11-944(a), “‘. . . to punish for disobedience of an order or for contempt committed in the presence of the court.'” Slip op. at 9 (quoting Eisenberg v. Swain, 233 A.3d 13, 22 (D.C. 2020); quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “[i]n addition to its statutorily derived authority, the court retains a well-established power to punish for contempt that is inherent in the nature and constitution of a court . . . arising from the need to enforce compliance with the administration of the law.'” Id. at 10 (quoting Eisenberg, 233 A.3d at 22; ellipse in original; quotation marks omitted). “‘The decision whether to hold a party in civil contempt is confided to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will be reversed on appeal only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion.'” Id. (quoting Eisenberg, 233 A.3d at 22; brackets omitted).

Applying these standards and prior precedent, the Court of Appeals held that “[c]ontempt as a remedy for [the plaintiff’s] failure to pay the prior award of attorneys’ fees and costs was beyond the trial court’s discretion here.” Id. at 10. It explained that the trial court’s “award of attorneys’ fees and costs constituted a money judgment,” id. (citing Super. Ct. Civ. R. 54(a) & 58(a)(3)), and that its prior precedent instructs that “‘absent statutory authority or exceptional circumstances, contempt in general, and the imposition of imprisonment in particular, are not appropriate means to enforce a money judgment or an award of counsel fees and costs.” Id. (quoting In re Estate of Bonham, 817 A.2d 192, 195 (D.C. 2003)). It stated that the appropriate means to enforce a money judgment is “by seeking a writ of execution or fieri facias.” Id. (citing Super. Ct. Civ. R. 69(a) & D.C. Code § 15-307).

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order holding the plaintiff in civil contempt. Id. at 12.

Douglas C. Melcher

I am a licensed attorney with about twenty years of experience in the private practice of law. I focus my practice on advising and representing individuals, small businesses, and non-profits in civil litigation, including trial court proceedings, appeals, administrative hearings, mediation, and arbitration. I have written numerous articles for D.C. Law Blog and other publications, and am the author of Tort Claims and Defenses in the District of Columbia, which is a handbook for lawyers about civil claims for injury to persons, property, reputation, and commercial interests. Please feel free to contact me if you would like to inquire about assistance with a legal matter. I can be reached at dmelcher@melcherlaw.com or 202-427-5753. For further information about my background, click here.