Court of Appeals Reverses Dismissal of Lawsuit for Want of Prosecution Where Plaintiff Arrived Late for Trial

ByDouglas C. Melcher

On April 4, 2024, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decided Hasbrouck v. Bernstein Management Corporation, 22-CV-0537, Slip op. (D.C. Apr. 4, 2024), in which it explained and applied the standards for determining whether a case should be dismissed for want of prosecution pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 41(b).

The case began with the plaintiff (who was proceeding pro se) filing a lawsuit for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle incident. See Slip op. at 1. The plaintiff failed to arrive on time for the first day of trial. See id. at 1-2. After waiting for ten minutes after the scheduled start time, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit for want of prosecution pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 41(b). See id. The plaintiff arrived in the courtroom less than twenty minutes later and was told by a courtroom clerk that the case was dismissed. See id. at 2. The plaintiff filed a timely motion to vacate the dismissal but the trial court denied it on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to show good cause for being late. See id. The plaintiff then appealed. See id.

The Court of Appeals began its analysis by explaining the applicable legal standards. It stated that “[a]lthough a trial court has the authority to dismiss an action when a plaintiff fails to prosecute their case, Super. Ct. Civ. R. 41(b)(1), doing so is an ‘extreme sanction’ which should be imposed ‘only sparingly or in extraordinary circumstances,’ given the strong preference that cases be decided on their merits.” Slip. op. at 7 (quoting District of Columbia v. Serafin, 617 A.2d 516, 519 (D.C. 1992) (per curiam)).  It further stated that “[i]n ruling on Rule 41(b) motions, either in the first instance or in considering a motion to vacate, trial courts should consider a variety of factors, including ‘(1) the nature of the party’s conduct, including whether it was willful; (2) the length of any delay in complying with the court’s order; (3) the reasons for the delay; and (4) any prejudice to the opposing party.’” Slip op. at 8 (quoting Landise v. Mauro, 141 A.3d 1067, 1077 (D.C. 2016)).

The Court of Appeals concluded that “[t]he trial court’s failure to so much as consider those relevant factors – or any lesser sanctions – in denying the motion to vacate is a standalone basis for vacating the dismissal order and remanding the case.” Slip. op. at 9. It further concluded that the trial court dismissed solely on the basis of the plaintiff’s tardiness which “is wrong and cannot be squared with our precedents . . . [which] instruct that a single instance of tardiness, absent any finding that the party was deliberately late, will not justify the outright dismissal of a case.” Slip op. at 9-10 (internal citations and footnote omitted).

Rather than merely vacate and remand the trial court’s decision, however, the Court of Appeals went a step farther and directed that the trial court reinstate the plaintiff’s lawsuit. See Slip op. at 14. In arriving at that decision, the Court of Appeals considered the four factors stated above and noted, inter alia, that (1) there was no indication that the plaintiff’s tardiness was deliberate or habitual; (2) the plaintiff’s tardiness was minimal; (3) the plaintiff’s explanation for being late, although not compelling, was not outlandish; and (4) there was no indication of prejudice to the defendants. See id. at 11-13.

The Court of Appeals noted that on remand the trial court could choose to consider imposing a lesser sanction for the plaintiff’s tardiness, but the sanction “would need to be commensurate with the offense.” See Slip. op. at 13.

Douglas C. Melcher

I am a licensed attorney with about twenty years of experience in the private practice of law. I focus my practice on advising and representing individuals, small businesses, and non-profits in civil litigation, including trial court proceedings, appeals, administrative hearings, mediation, and arbitration. I have written numerous articles for D.C. Law Blog and other publications, and am the author of Tort Claims and Defenses in the District of Columbia, which is a handbook for lawyers about civil claims for injury to persons, property, reputation, and commercial interests. Please feel free to contact me if you would like to inquire about assistance with a legal matter. I can be reached at dmelcher@melcherlaw.com or 202-427-5753. For further information about my background, click here.